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Abstract
Conflict resolution is considered essential for durable peace and security between warring 
groups and states and confidence building is deemed a first step for conflict resolution Indo- 
Pakistan conflicts are of a complicated nature and the tasks of conflict resoluuon and 
confidence building are discussed, examined, and analyzed in this paper The end of the cold 
war has given India and Pakistan an opportunity to normalize their relations and revitalize 
their approach for dealing with issues related to security matters and the well being of their 
future generations For conflict resolution between India and Pakistan it is necessary that the 
two countries should first develop confidence and trust by adopting confidence building 
measures (CBMs) Conflict resoluuon is the end and CBMs should be adopted as a means to 
this end by New Delhi and Islamabad
The key argument in this paper is India and Pakistan have not main tamed a balance between 
military and nonmilitary CBMs Military CBMs have been adopted with the sole purpose of 
avoiding war and not to normalize Indo-Pakistan relations Therefore the importance of 
nonmilitary CBMs has been undermined As a result, Indo Pakistan relauons have not reached 
a stage of normalcy The Gordian Knot of Indo Pakistani conflict can only be cut if the two 
countries adopt strategies to establish a CBM regime Such a regime should be established by 
governmental and nongovernmental circles in India and Pakistan to msntunonalize the process 
of conflict resoluuon and confidence building m military and nonmilitary fields If the two 
countries succeed in breaking free of the vicious cycle of confrontauon then it will become 
possible to seek posiuve results from CBMs The task is difficult, but not impossible 
because the two countries have launched the first generauon of confidence building measures 
Nonetheless the proposed CBM regime will go a long way m establishing conflict and 
tension free relauons between India and Pakistan
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Indo-Pakistan Normalization Process 
The Role of CBMs in the Post Cold War Era
Mooms Ahmar
Introduction
With the demise of the cold war and the unfolding of a new political order on the international scene 
approaches to the problems of war and peace have also begun to change The need to resolve conflicts 
peacefully by adopting confidence building measures (CBMs) at military and nonmilitary1 levels is being 
realized in many circles Conflict resolution is considered essential for a durable peace between waning groups 
or states and confidence building is deemed a first step for conflict resolution Hence conflict resolution and 
confidence building are interlinked m launching the process of peace and cooperation in different parts of the 
world.
The world is experiencing the outbreak of new conflicts yet the settlement of old ones is also required. 
Some of these conflicts have either been resolved or are near to settlement2 whereas in the case of other 
conflicts it is becoming increasingly difficult to find a solution3 Indo Pakistan conflicts are of a complicated 
nature and the tasks of conflict resolution and confidence building are discussed examined and analyzed in this 
paper The end of the cold war has given India and Pakistan an opportunity to revitalize their approach to 
dealing with issues related to security matters and the well being of future generations
When conflict resolution and CBMs are mentioned in the context of the Indo Pakistan normalization 
process the practical application of these techniques is questioned given the decades of animosity and hostile 
state of the relationship For conflict resolution between India and Pakistan it is essential that the two 
countries first develop confidence and trust by adopting confidence building measures Conflict resolution 
should be the desired end, and CBMs should be adopted by New Delhi and Islamabad as a means to that end 
This paper attempts to examine the application of CBMs as a prerequisite for conflict resolution between India 
and Pakistan in the post cold war era. In addition to discussing the conceptual framework of CBMs it also 
spells out the relevance of CBMs that India and Pakistan have adopted in the recent past to accomplish war 
avoidance deescalaüon of conflicts and normalization of relations
CBMs Significance for India and Pakistan
Past attempts to resolve tension and promote cooperaüon between India and Pakistan have either been abortive 
or have met with resistance from various political circles in the two countries but one cannot disregard the fact 
that in the changing political environment, neither India nor Pakistan can afford to sustain the policy of 
confrontation The costs of cold war and noncooperation particularly at the current economic level are colossal 
to those countries as well In this regard the significance and importance of CBMs for India and Pakistan must 
be taken into account It is m the interest of New Delhi and Islamabad to build an infrastructure for the peaceful 
settlement of disputes first by establishing mutual trust and second, by adopting confidence building measures
Though it is true that past endeavors toward conflict resolution and CBMs between India and Pakistan 
cannot be described as a success story ” the two countries have not entirely failed in dispute resolution India 
and Pakistan succeeded in settling some of their most complicated disputes over the distribution of nver water
1 Military CBMs are mainly related to measures taken on the governmental level to defuse border tension monitor military 
exercises and avoid the accidental outbreak of war Non military CBMs are adopted on the governmental and non governmental 
levels to promote economic political and socio cultural cooperation so as to remove mutual mistrust and fears For an interesting 
discussion on CBMs see George D Moffett Confidence Building for Peace The Christian Science Monitor 24 September 1992 
2. Some of the conflicts that have been resolved in the last ten years are the Namibian and Eritrean conflicts Whereas conflicts 
that are near to settlement are in Cambodia Afghanistan and South Africa W Scott Thompson Conflict and Conflict Resolution 
On to the Twenty First Century ” Dialogues on Conflict Resolution Bridging Theory and Practice (Washington D C United Sutes 
Institute of Peace March 1993) p 9 20
3 These conflicts are between Arabs and Israelis over territories captured by Israel during the June 1967 w ar between India and 
Pakistan over Kashmir between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus and 
between Serbs Muslims and Croats over Bosnia Ibid
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by signing the Indus Water Treaty in 1960 and the Rann of Kutch Treaty m 1968 New Delhi and Islamabad 
have also managed despite a threatening security environment in the subcontinent to hold on to the first 
generation CBMs” related to war avoidance and deescalation of accidental crises
The process of implementing conflict resolution and CBMs between India and Pakistan can receive impetus 
from similar processes that are being launched m other conflict ridden areas of the world such as Northeast Asia 
Southeast Asia the South Pacific Zone the Middle East, and in some parts of Africa and Laun America 4 Such 
a process was launched m Europe involving the United States and the former Soviet Union under the Helsinki 
Final Act of August 1 1975 The Conference on Security and Cooperation m Europe (CSCE) provided an 
infrastructure for détente and confidence building measures at military and nonmilitary levels in the post 
Helsinki accords period
It is high time for India and Pakistan to take similar initiatives for durable peace and cooperation m South 
Asia, especially when India and China are holding talks to adopt CBMs for the peaceful settlement of disputes 
and normalization of relations Therefore the mechanism for conflict resolution and CBMs m South Asia 
should be examined m the light of similar efforts being made in other parts of the world. Such developments 
can give an impetus to the process of détente m South Asia particularly between India and Pakistan
Indo-Pakistan normalization of relations has two important dimensions first security measures for 
deescalation of tension war avoidance and understanding of how to settle unresolved issues These measures are 
related to military affairs and fall under the category of confidence and security building measures (CSBMs)
The second dimension involves nonsecunty steps taken for normalization particularly m political economic 
and sociocultural fields Here there is also a vision for cooperation in areas like environment water resources 
energy infrastructure (telecommunication links integration of road and railway networks integration of power 
grids) agriculture industry science and technology
In the last forty seven years there have been many ups and downs in Indo Pakistan relations The two 
countries have missed numerous opportunities to improve their ties the existing level of tension is a reminder 
of past bitterness and hostility In the tight of historical acrimony one viable option open to overcome the 
stalemate is to systematically apply the tools of conflict resolution and CBMs
The role of CBMs in the Indo-Pakistan context is crucial because without establishing proper trust and 
mutual confidence New Delhi and Islamabad cannot move ahead for peace and stability in South Asia. Apart 
from other merits of CBMs this framework gives warring parties an opportunity to develop mutual trust so as 
to reduce the level of confrontation and move towards cooperation Because the center of rivalry and conflict in 
South Asia is between India and Pakistan the adoption of CBMs must involve these two countries Indeed 
peace and security m South Asia depend on normal and cordial ties between New Delhi and Islamabad The 
same is true m the case of the viability of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 
established in December 1985
Several steps have been taken by India and Pakistan m the past, particularly in the post Simla accord period 
to defuse tension and to overcome the crisis in confidence In the early 1990s serious initiatives were taken by 
both sides to institutionalize the process of CBMs particularly in the military field Such steps and initiatives 
will be discussed in detail m the following pages Because the level of tension in Indo Pakistan relations has 
escalated recently there is a need on the part of the two countries to salvage CBMs that they have already 
adopted. The failure of these CBMs could lead to an all out war in the subcontinent Moreover it is imperative 
for New Delhi and Islamabad to explore possibilities for other CBMs particularly in nonmititary fields
4 For example in Northeast Asia the process of conflict resolution and CBMs received an impetus when North and South Korea 
signed the Non Aggression Pact in 1992 and decided to start talks on the reunification of the Korean Peninsula In Southeast Asia a 
significant breakthrough has been achieved to settle the Cambodian conflict In the Middle East peace talks are going on between 
Israel, the Palestinians and Arab states In Africa the Namibian dispute has been settled Eritrea has emerged as an independent sute 
after years of fighting with Ethiopia and talks are going on to seek a political compromise between the black majority and white 
minority in South Africa. Latin America Brazil and Argentina decided to establish conflict free ties and share their expertise m the 
nuclear field In Nicaragua, peace returned after years of civil war when elections were held in 1989 In the South Pacific efforts for 
peace and cooperation gained strength when the majority of the South Pacific countries agreed to form zones of peace freedom and 
neutrality Conflict resolution m the above mentioned examples was possible only when the warring parties adopted confidence 
building measures India and Pakistan can learn lessons from such examples
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CBMs The Conceptual Framework
CBMs are defined in both military and nonmilitary terms In essence confidence building measures tend to 
reduce tension between two or more adversaries by establishing mutual trust and a willingness to cooperate in 
military and nonmilitary fields
CBMs are arrangements designed to enhance assurance of rrund and belief in the trustworthiness of 
states CBMs constitute building blocks that can provide operational substance to the notion of common 
security 5
What CBMs can accomplish is the promotion of stability in both peacetime and m crisis situations by 
providing tangible and verifiable assurances to build confidence regarding the purpose and character of military 
activities 6
CBMs are an established pattem of behavior giving each nation reasonable assurance that no other 
country will attack or exploit a situation to the serious disadvantage of another 7
Confidence building is, by nature a process m which each previous measure forms a basis for further 
measures that progressively and cumulatively consolidate and strengthen the building of confidence 8
The idea of promoting the feelings of trust and confidence between hostile states or groups forms the logical 
basis of CBMs As a matter of fact, the exercise of military and nonmilitary CBMs could be futile if the pames 
concerned lack mutual trust and are suspicious about intent According to James Macintosh confidence building 
is a concept notable for the imprecision of various attempts to define it.”9 In this connection it should be taken 
into account that there is a clear distinction between CBMs applicable m security (military) and nonsec un ty 
fields It is a fallacy to view CBMs m terms of military security alone
Theoretically CBMs provide a mechanism not only for war avoidance and conflict management but also 
help to promote economic poliucal sociocultural and other types of cooperation between hostile states and 
groups As far as the military aspect of CBMs are concerned they minimize the danger of surpnse attack 
escalation of conflict, miscalculation or misunderstanding in vital areas of the secunty of states Jonathan 
Alford defined CBMs as measures that tend to make military intentions obvious 10 A US Department of State 
publication defines CBMs as
Agreements between countries to increase openness mutual understanding and communication designed 
to reduce the possibility of conflict through accident, miscalculation, or failure of communications and to 
inhibit opportunities for surpnse attack or political intimidation thereby increasing stability m times of 
calm as well as cnsis 11
The functions of military CBMs can be broken down as 
Direct communication 
Shared information 
Notification
Venfication observation, and monitoring 
Stabilization and regulation of military arrangements 
Cnsis management
5 For a conceptual study of CBMs see Johan Jorgan Holst, Confidence Building Measures A Conceptual Framework,
Survival (January/February 1983) 2
6. John Borowski, The Wodd of CBMs ” Avoiding War In The Nuclear Age Confidence Budding Measures fo r  Crisis Stabdity 
(London Westview Press 1986) p 9
7 See Abbot Brayton Confidence Building Measures in European Secunty The World Today (October 1980) 382.
8 Comprehensive Study o f the Groups o f Governmental Experts on Confidence Building Measures United Nations A/36/474 
p 13 14 quoted in Ljubivoje Acimovic Future Perspecuves of Confidence Building Measures as a Means to Stabilize International 
Relations in Karl Kaiser ed Confidence Budding Measures (Bonn Europa Union Verlag Gmb 1983) p 120
9 See James Macintosh Confidence Building Measures A Conceptual Framework m R B Byers F Stephen Larrabee and 
Allen Lynch eds Confidence Budding Measures and International Security (New York N Y Institute of East West Asian Studies 
1987) quoted in Andrew Mack, “Confidence and Secunty Building Measures and Military Secunty Disarmament X m  (3) (1990) 142
10 W Epstein and B T Feld eds New Directions in Disarmament (New York N Y  Praeger 1981) quoted in Andrew Mack, 
Und p 143
11 “Arms Control Confidence Building Measures Gist (Washinglon D C US Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs 
January 1985) 1 Also cited in John Borowski The World of CBMs ” Avoiding War in the Nuclear Age (London Westview Press 
1986) p 9 10
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The purpose of such measures is to enhance a firm belief in the announced intentions of other states with 
respect to their security policies and the facts with regard to the military activities and capabilities that sustain 
those policies 12 In addition military CBMs tend to improve the political environment of defense forces or the 
process that could lead to their use in such a way that the chances for political as opposed to military 
approaches to existing conflicts are unproved13
CBMs fall into three mam categories
Transparency measures These measures provide for the sharing of information on the size shape, and 
movement of aimed forces and reduce the chances of surprise attack
Communication measures Under these measures the most effective arrangement is the hot Ime that is designed 
to lower the risk of accidental war
Constraint measures These measures include the regulation of various military activities and limit peacetime 
maneuvers that could be viewed as threatening by an adversary 14 
CBMs can undoubtedly be identified as steps contributing to the propagation of confidence Yet CBMs as a 
specific concept dealing with the military aspects of security implying a special category of measures for 
implementation have their own identity and a special rather precise place and meaning in the contemporary 
history of international relations13
Some of the most important aims of CBMs as stated in the Helsinki Final Act, are eliminauon of the 
causes of tension and consolidation of peace and security in the world, reinforcement of mutual confidence and, 
thereby promotion of greater stability and security m Europe exclusion of the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state and reduction of the danger of armed conflict and of a 
possible misunderstanding or mistaken calculation of military acuvity16
CBMs are an institutional process that may take years or decades to render positive results Within this 
process the parties concerned must show political will particularly on the policymaking level to reduce 
tension resolve conflicts and embark on meaningful cooperation conduct direct communication with each 
other discourage negative propaganda, suspicions and mistrust against each otherexpress ability to control 
domestic political factors that may negauvely influence CBMs and demonstrate patience and willingness to act 
with prudence particularly m a crisis situation According to Qm Huasun a Chinese expert on disarmament 
CBMs are a step-by step process involving certain conditions
Geographical scope bilateral arrangements given top priority followed by multilateral arrangements in small 
regions that can then be gradually expanded to encompass large areas (as needed)
Measures to be taken CBMs should take precedence and those should be developed into security arrangements 
for disarmament at a later stage
Nature o f contacts and meetings between countries emphasis should first be laid on scholarly discussions and a 
low level of contacts to prepare the ground for high level meetmgs
Tuning institution of CBMs and security mechanisms should be viewed as a contmuous process of gradual 
evolution, which needs time and patience 17
According to Christian Harleman the following tools related to confidence building measures should be 
used for the settlement of regional conflicts
Practical mechanisms for containing conflicts and facilitating their settlement.
Practical arrangements required to deal with demobilization including disarmament and arms control elections 
and human rights monitoring and humanitarian assistance
Meeting regional conflicts with a flexible response corresponding to each particular situation and local 
conditions
12 For a detailed study c i  the theoretical and conceptual framework of CBMs see Johan Jorjan Holst p 2 15 and Karl Kaiser 
Back to the Politics of Conflict in Kari Kaiser ed Confidence Building Measures (Bonn Europa Union Vertag Gmb H 1983) p
1 4
13 Karl Kaiser Ibid p 1
14 George D Moffett
15 Ljubivoje Acimovic Future Perspectives of Confidence Building Measures as a Means to Stabilize Intemattonal 
Relations ” in Karl Kaiser ed p 113 14
16 Adam Darnel Rolf eld Confidence and Security Building Measures in Robert D Blackwill and F Stephen Larrabee 
Conventional Arms Control and East West Security (London Duke University Press 1989) p 360
17 Qm Huasun “Confidence Building Measures in the Asia/Pacific Region ” Disarmament XIV (3) (1991) 150
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Implementation of confidence building arrangements for example providing machinery for bilateral or 
multilateral arms control verification
Regional peacemaking centers interlinked and coordinated with existing or future disarmament centers
These centers should promote peacekeeping and peace building activities explore the theoretical and practical 
process of ending hostilines and of enhancing the capacity of regional organizations to conduct regional 
peacekeeping/peace building operations and, when required, contribute to international peace In the more 
practical aspects of such a mandate a peacekeeping center should provide the framework and coordination 
necessary to establish a regional standby peacekeeping force The center should also have the capacity to provide 
the necessary tools (verifiers) for some peace building activities in other words verification of regional or 
bilateral disarmament and arms limitation treaties In the peace building efforts the center would also develop 
other practical mechanisms for resolving disputes in a nonviolent manner and in such a way as to promote and 
develop military integration m the region18
With regard to CBMs in nonmilitary fields sustained efforts have to be made to establish economic 
political and sociocultural contacts between states in conflict with each other There is a thin Ime that 
differentiates military and nonmilitary CBMs In fact, success in the adoption of CBMs in the military field is 
linked to the outcome of CBMs practiced in the nonmilitary field Over emphasis on either military or 
nonmilitary CBMs may be counterproductive and vitiate efforts made for peace and stability in a particular area.
CBMs were institutionalized as a mechanism for war avoidance and cooperation in security and nonsecunty 
affairs among the signatories of the Helsinki Final Act But with the passage of time the application of 
CBMs became common in other conflict and crisis ndden areas of the world particularly in the third world In 
this regard Qin Huasun suggested the adoption of the following CBMs in the military field for the Asia/Pacific 
countries m particular and the world m general
Nuclear weapon states should undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear weapon 
states
In order to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons the countries concerned may set up Nuclear Weapons 
Free Zones or Zones of Peace, whose status should be respected by nuclear weapon states 
Military bases troops and military equipment, especially nuclear weapons that are set up or stationed on the 
territory of other countries must be dismantled or withdrawn no country in the Asia/Pacific region should send 
military forces overseas
Military equipment retired as a result of disarmament measures m other parts of the world should be destroyed It 
should not be transferred to Asia and the Pacific because such transfers will only constitute new factors of 
instability m this region
Every country should exercise self restraint in terms of armaments and military spending and should not seek to 
achieve a level of armaments higher than that required for its legitimate defensive needs Every country should 
also take measures to make its military strategy and the structure of its armed forces strictly defensive in nature 
In regions where conditions are appropriate the countries concerned can and should, through consultations on a 
voluntary basis reach arrangements for the exchange and verification of military information and statistics and 
for the declaration and mutual inspection of military maneuvers 19
According to the same author the following nonmilitary confidence building measures should be implemented 
Political and diplomane relations between countries established and developed on the basis of the principles of 
mutual respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity mutual nonaggression noninterference in the internal 
affairs of other countries and peaceful coexistence
Economic relations between countries established and developed on the basis of the principle of mutual benefit
The search for fair and reasonable political solutions to the existing problems of the regional hot spots must 
be expedited
An end must be put to aggression against and occupation of other countries influence m the internal affairs of 
other countries and all forms of external expansion and hegemony
International disputes must be settled m a strictly peaceful manner that is through negotiations and 
consultation
18 Christian Harleman “Regional Conflicts Peace keeping and Disarmament in the Peace Building Process” Disarmament XV 
(3) (1992) 127 28
19 Qui Huasun “Confidence Building Measures m the Asia/Pacific Region p 151 52
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No country should seek to unpose its social system and ideology upon other countries much less interfere m 
the internal affairs and violate the sovereignty of other countries under such pretexts
The exchange of staff and information m the political, economic social and cultural fields should be promoted 
among all countries especially among those whose relations for whatsoever reason, are tense 20
Some of the military and nonmilitary CBMs stated by Huasun have been tried m tension areas of the 
Asia/Pacific region such as Cambodia, between North and South Korea and between China and the former 
Soviet Union. But will it be possible to follow some of the above suggested measures—particularly those 
concerning disarmament, a strict policy of noninterference and nonintervention to be followed by states and the 
peaceful settlement of disputes m the Indo Pakistan context7 These measures seem to be idealistic in nature and 
would require enough political will be expressed by New Delhi and Islamabad
It is essential that the approach to CBMs be based on reciprocity and be above suspicion Both parties 
should be willing to talk to each other matters of conflict and be receptive to establishing conflict free relations 
It is an uphill task and both sides involved in the process of CBMs and conflict resolution should be consistent 
in their endeavors and ready to give concessions Half hearted CBMs can only discredit the normalization 
process
Against this background the tasks of conflict resolution and CBMs are crucial given the existence of 
unresolved conflicts in the Asia/Pacific region particularly between North and South Korea, Cambodia, and 
among the South Asian countries While CBMs have ielauvely deescala ted tensions in Northeast and Southeast 
Asia the situation in South Asia appears to be very pessimistic
The two major countries of South Asia—India and Pakistan—experience a high level of tension 
particularly because of the Kashmir dispute SAARC which was launched in December 1985 to promote 
regional cooperation in South Asia, has failed to achieve this objective because of the unstable relations between 
New Delhi and Islamabad.
CBMs and the Indo Pakistan Conflicts
In the case of India and Pakistan the sustained level of tension owing to Kashmir and other disputes calls for 
the adoption of a new serious and practical approach to overcome decades of hostility and mistrust. But, given 
the institutional shape of Indo-Pakistan conflicts is it possible for the two countries to revamp their 
relationship and establish conflict free relations7
Recent events in the post cold war era particularly in the former Soviet Union have sent shock waves 
through the influential circles in India and Pakistan that are concerned with the upsurge of ethnic and religious 
forces m the sub-contment If India and Pakistan do not take cognizance of this situation and instead commue 
with their past policy of confrontation the outcome may be similar to what is going on in the former Soviet 
Union and former Yugoslavia. If economic reforms are not properly introduced, if democratic institutions are 
not protected from the impending rise of fascist forces and if decentralization at all levels of government and the 
economy is not established to guarantee the rights of minorities then the results could be disastrous for the two 
countries
Turmoil in the subcontinent will destabilize not only South Asia, but will also affect peripheral areas such 
as Southeast Asia, Southwest Asia and Central Asia Nevertheless there is strong evidence that attitudes are 
changing m New Delhi and Islamabad on matters of conflict
Despite accumulating billions of dollars worth of weapons21 and embarking on the dangerous course of a 
nuclear arms race neither India nor Pakistan have been able to achieve a sense of security On the contrary the 
Indo-Pakistan arms race and noncooperation with each other m economic commercial and other areas of 
bilateral interest have proved to be counter productive Judged from any angle the people of India and Pakistan 
are not better off as compared to those living in countries where the process of conflict resolution and 
confidence building has achieved the desired results
20 Ibid
21 India s defense expenditures during 1991 were $8 07 billion us defense budget for 1992 was $7 41 billion Pakistan s 
defense expenditures during 1991 were $3.23 billion and its defense budget for 1992 was $3 29 billion See The Military Balance 
1992 93 (London IISS 1992) p 131 135
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The task of conflict resolution between India and Pakistan is well suited to the application of CBMs One 
school of thought in Pakistan—largely composed of academicians journalists some segments of the 
intelligentsia former policymakers and retired servicemen—asserts that despite escalation in Indo Pakistan 
conflicts both countries have not gone to war partly because they have adopted certain CBMs (as described 
below) concerning deescalation of tension and war avoidance Although New Delhi and Islamabad have not 
signed the No War Pact nor a formal arrangement for war avoidance the costs of war and the CBMs adopted at 
the military level have contributed to prevenuon of any future war in the subconunent
The Simla Agreement, signed by India and Pakistan on 1 July 1972 in the Indian city of Simla is also 
cited by the same school as a model for the peaceful settlement of disputes The agreement was signed in the 
aftermath of the Indo-Pakistan war of December 1971 and pledged to normalize bilateral relations between India 
and Pakistan and settlement of outstanding disputes including Kashmir by peaceful means Therefore one can 
justify the relevance of CBMs for war avoidance especially when unsettled disputes between the two countries 
are explosive in nature and have a potential to subvert attempts for peace and cooperation
The second school of thought in Pakistan—composed of hardliners in various political parties religious 
groups segments of academicians journalists and the establishment both civilian and military—disregards the 
importance of CBMs in the Indo-Pakistan context It argues that India s quest for preeminence in the South 
Asian region is detrimental for the normalization process Hence unless India amends its policy vis à vis its 
neighbors by abandoning efforts for regional domination it is meaningless to talk of CBMs The same school 
of thought favors Pakistan s disengagement from SAARC and establishment of close links with the newly 
formed economic cum political bloc of West and Central Asian countries the Economic Cooperation 
Organization (ECO) This school holds that as long as India does not respect the sovereignty of its small 
neighbors SAARC cannot emerge as a useful regional organization Settlement of outstanding disputes 
particularly of Kashmir is also cited as a precondition for the application of military and nonmilitary CBMs in 
Indo-Pakistan relations
Regardless of the current negative reaction to conflict resolution and CBMs between India and Pakistan 
senous thinking about cooperation is being done by intellectuals and academicians m the two countries A few 
rounds of unofficial dialogue between the two sides to discuss the possibilities of cooperation have also been 
held m New Delhi and Islamabad-
On the governmental level no significant breakthrough has been achieved to normalize Indo Pakistan 
relations although some initiatives from the nongovernmental side are being taken For instance on 25 April 
1990 Academics for Peace m South Asia” passed a resolution in New Delhi that stated the unity of the people 
of South Asia makes conciliation rather than confrontation the natural inclination of the people of this region 
regardless of natural boundaries ” The resolution further stated that the real problems of the people of South 
Asia cannot be solved by war The present international situation had demonstrated the futility of armed 
confrontation as a method of resolving conflicts between states and that political institutions were capable of 
resolving conflicts without recourse to violence The academicians appealed to all scholars and professionals to 
ensure the pnmacy of reason and dialogue so that war ceases to be a legitimate option for resolving disputes 
Concerned citizens were urged to send representatives to their political leaders expressing opposition to war and 
faith m peaceful resolution of conflicts The Academics for Peace” requested that the political leaders of India 
and Pakistan set m motion the processes that would ensure there were no future wars 22
On 9 September 1991 a seminar sponsored by the Pakistan Chapter of the Afro Asian People s Solidarity 
was held at Lahore that called for a new regional order for SAARC countries through closer political and 
economic cooperation The speakers at the seminar maintained that the security predicament of the South Asian 
countries relates to democracy peace and development As pointed out in that seminar by an emment Indian 
journalist, Bhabam Sen Gupta.
The responsibility for not resolving the vital questions is on political parties that thrive on conflicts 
because they have no program for uplifting society The rulers of the area boomed their guns not only on 
another state but also on their own people and spent huge resources for the maintenance of law and order to 
stay m power We are not at war but we are not at peace either Despite tension between India and Pakistan 
no war is possible because both governments have lost their patrons and thus don t enjoy the authority
22 “Academics Favor Talks With Pak ” The Hindustan Times 26 Apnl 1990
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required for launching an offensive The aid  of the cold war and changes around the world should have 
brought the countries of the region closer instead, they remained as isolated as ever before The result was 
that they were spending huge resources to build and strengthen their armies as if they wanted to maintain the 
conflict and tension History was witness to the fact that military might was no longer a solution to the 
problems that had assumed complexity m the region and that there is no other way to resolve them except to 
turn to each other and start a dialogue to rectify the wrongs done m the past We must make a new start, so the 
behavior must change 23
Similarly in a signed statement issued on 30 January 1993 a number of Pakistani journalists intellectuals 
politicians and columnists urged Islamabad and New Delhi to improve the ties that have deteriorated sharply as 
a result of the destruction of the Babn Mosque in the Indian city of Ayodhya on 6 December 1992 and have 
reached their lowest ebb since 1971 Both countries appear to be drifting towards confrontation 24 The group 
stated.
The forces of fascism were getting stronger m the subcontinent and had been trying to undermine 
democratic institutions in both countries by exploiting rehgion and preaching a narrow anti humanist 
version of nationalism It is necessary to fight this mtolerance and bigotry if we are not to drift mto another 
war that could have disastrous consequences for the entire subcontinent But unfortunately the subcontinent 
appears to be bereft of statesmanship m this unhappy decade It is truly m the interests of India and Pakistan 
to work for a peaceful solution of all outstanding disputes between them so as to pave the way for peace and 
tranquillity in the region that could benefit the subcontinent and mankind 25
The assertion of Indian and Pakistani intellectuals academicians and other sections of intelligentsia against 
the forces of fascism and violence will go a long way toward strengthening the process of peace and cooperation 
in the subcontinent However one cannot underestimate the influence and power of those forces that have a 
vested interest in perpetuating tension and conflicts between India and Pakistan at all levels The strategic 
thinkers of India and Pakistan should realize the gravity of the situation and adopt a constructive approach to deal 
with the issues of peace and security affecting the two states
It was rightly stated by an analyst on security affairs in the National Defence College Journal of Pakistan
that
The intellectuals of the two countries realize that defense spending for arms buildup is addmg to the miseries 
of the two peoples and, therefore a way has to be found to achieve rapprochement between India and 
Pakistan However neither side is prepared to lower then guard or give mto the demands or even the 
proposals of the other Somehow this deadlock or stalemate has to be broken Leaders of both countries 
must develop the political environment necessary to undertake each other s point of view and show a 
willingness to resolve the basic issues like Siachen Wuler Barrage and demarcation of boundaries 26
But will it be possible to lower the political temperature and ease Indo Pakistan tension7 Unfortunately the 
political environment in India and Pakistan is charged with ill will animosity and mutual suspicion Steps 
taken toward normalization and cooperation could not be sustained because of the periodic outbreak of tensions 
encouraged by hardliners
Some optimism regarding the Indo-Pakistan normalization process was expressed by the former Indian 
Prime Minister V P Singh when he visited Pakistan to attend the SAARC opposition parties seminar 
organized by the Pakistan Peoples Party Talking to journalists at the Karachi Press Club on 7 September 1992 
he said.
Despite the senous problems between India and Pakistan that have not allowed them to develop friendly 
relations the two neighbors are being forced by the changing political scenario and their compelling 
economic needs to enter mto an agreement on the pursuit of common interests Confrontation would lead us 
nowhere We cannot afford war because it would only bring destruction and misery for our people 27
One may not agree with the views of V P Singh but the question remains as to what extent the policy makers 
of India and Pakistan will subscribe to demands for peace and cooperation A pragmatic approach to change the
23 See Seminar Calls For Regional Order For SAARC States Dawn 10 September 1991
24 See “Intellectuals Urge Pakistan India to Improve Relations Dawn 20 Januaiy 1992
25 Ibid
26 S Imza Hussain “Conventional Force Reduction— Prospects and Implications For Pakistan and India NDC Journal (1990 
1991) 37
27 Dawn 8 September 1992
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course of things in Indo Pakistan relations would require reversal of conventional wisdom and each nation s 
psyche
The war psychosis so frequently projected by the vested mierest groups from both sides must be replaced by 
serious endeavors for confidence building leading to conflict resolution between New Delhi and Islamabad.
Major disputes between India and Pakistan are an obstruction to the course of normalization but progress m 
other areas could ultimately help settle these disputes Building on mutual trust particularly at the 
policymaking level28 is also essential for the success of CBMs
The major concern of India, Pakistan and certain external powers—the United States Peoples Republic of 
China and Russia—is to keep the level of tension under control and avoid the outbreak of hostilities Their 
primary concern is based on the possibility of nuclear catastrophe if war breaks out
Since January 1990 when the Kashmir dispute assumed alarming proportions both countries have been 
obsessed with an inexorable state of new cold war* on the subcontinent. One can frequently hear war slogans 
and reports regarding troop mobilization on the Indo Pakistan borders For instance a Pakistan foreign office 
spokesman said on 17 March 1993 m Islamabad that India has concentrated the bulk of its troops on the 
Pakistani borders posing a continuous threat to Pakistan s security 29 India has reacted to these Pakistani 
charges by implicating Pakistan in terrorist acts m the Indian controlled part of Kashmir in the Indian Punjab 
and in the Bombay bomb blasts of March 1993
Needless to say the political atmosphere of India and Pakistan is charged with emotions and resentment 
against each other Interestingly despite a threatening posture adopted by the regimes and hawkish elements of 
the two countries the normalization process has not been entirely abandoned and talks on nuclear 
nonproliferation Siachen Wuler Barrage Sir Creek, and improved economic ties (discussed below) may yield 
some positive results in the foreseeable future
Some assurances are now being given by official circles m New Delhi and Islamabad to overcome the 
present impasse in their relationship At a press briefing given in Islamabad on 17 January 1993 Pakistan s 
additional secretary for foreign affairs maintained that Pakistan would continue its efforts to achieve normal 
relations with India and was against confrontation He hoped that India would proceed towards normalization 
between the two countries and the present situation would be overcome30 The Indian leaders have also rejected 
notions regarding the threat of war In the past the two countries succeeded in managing crises and averting the 
outbreak of hostilities In order to avoid direct military confrontation with India, Pakistani security forces have 
several times stopped militant Kashmins—mainly belonging to the Jammu and Kashmiri Liberation Front 
(JKLF)—from crossing the Lme of Control (LOC)
Beyond rhetoric about the need to avoid war and normalize ties some concrete CBMs were taken in the late 
1980s by New Delhi and Islamabad in this regard. The turning point came following the holding of the military 
exercises by India called Brasstacks” along the borders of Pakistan during the winter of 1986-87 In early 
December 1986 India began deploying troops on the joint borders in what was termed as routine exercises ”
But such exercises threatened peace in the subcontinent Taking cognizance of the situation both governments 
belatedly called for a reduction in their military presence and talks were held in New Delhi on 30 January 1987 
between senior foreign ministry officials of the two countries An official Indian spokesman m New Delhi said 
on 1 February that both sides had proposed concrete measures to prevent further escalation of tension and a 
memorandum of understanding was signed on 4 February that provided for the withdrawal of forces from both 
sides to a peace time position” over the next fifteen days31 President Zia s visit to Jaipur to see the cricket 
match and his meeting with Indian Premier Rajiv Gandhi also helped deescalate the tension between the two 
countries
28 Brahman Chellaney “A Regional Framework For Stability Indian Express 1 May 1991
29 “Indian Troop Deployment On Border Poses Threat FO Dawn 18 March 1993
30 Dawn 18 January 1993
31 Kessuigs s  Record o f  World Events XXXIII (3) (1987) 34496 See also Spotlight 13 June 1990 For a detailed account of 
Indo-Pakistan tension during Operation Brasstacks see Rikhye Ravi The War that Never Was The Story o f India s Strategic Failures 
(New Delhi Chanakya 1988) p 2 Robert G Wirsing Pakistan s Security Under Zia 1977 1988 (New York, NY St Martin s 
Press 1991) p 99 Surendra Chopra Post Simla Indo Pak Relations Confrontation to De escalation (New Delhi Deep and Deep 
Publications 1988) p 188
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Moreover on the occasion of the fourth SAARC summit held in Islamabad in December 1988 the then 
Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi as a friendly gesture announced the cancellation of routine exercises by the 
Indian military along the Pakistani borders Pakistan reciprocated when it invited international observers 
including those from India to see military exercises in December 1989 called Zarb i Momin ” Such steps 
taken by Pakistan and India proved to be useful for building mutual trust and confidence and the deescalation of 
tension
Since 1990 India and Pakistan have moved systematically to evolve an infrastructure for border crisis 
management supervised by the Director General of Military Operations from both sides On these grounds it 
became possible for New Delhi and Islamabad to communicate directly at the times of crisis along their borders
According to some sources in the spnng of 1990 India and Pakistan were on the bnnk of a nuclear war 
This deadly situation was reportedly averted when the US administration called on Robert M Gates then the 
Deputy National Security Advisor serving in the White House to fly to New Delhi and Islamabad and defuse 
tension between the two adversaries32 Some of the CBMs dealing with border tension and military exercises 
(see below) were tested m August 1991 when tension was high along the Poonch sector The Director of 
General Military Operations for Pakistan then contacted his Indian counterpart and expressed his country s 
concern regarding unprovoked Indian attacks on a Pakistan post m that sector and was told that such incidents if 
repeated in the future may jeopardize the CBMs adopted by the two countries over a period of tim e33
Amid the fragile nature of peace in the subcontinent CBMs taken on the military level have relatively 
reduced the risk of an accidental war Given the success of military CBMs agreed to between New Delhi and 
Islamabad India and Pakistan could embark on adopung nonmilitary CBMs These CBMs are essential in terms 
of filling the gaps m the Indo-Pakistan normalization process and giving an institutional shape to the tasks of 
peace stability and cooperation
The following list depicts different categories of existing and potential CBMs applicable in the case of India 
and Pakistan
CBMs ui the political field  There has been no major breakthrough in easing political tensions particularly 
with regard to propaganda campaigns against each of the two countries People to people interaction is also 
marginal because of severe restrictions and hostile political relationships Renewed tension between Islamabad 
and New Delhi on the Kashmir dispute has impeded progress in ameliorating political ties Informal rounds of 
Indo Pakistan dialogue have however been held in New Delhi and Islamabad Participants m that dialogue held 
extensive discussions on ways and means to normalize relations between the two countries Up till now eight 
meetings have been held between the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif and the Indian Prime Mmister 
Narasimha Rao over the last three years Six rounds of foreign secretaries talks have also been held since July 
1990
CBMs in the economic field  Progress has been very slow given a lack of will on the part of the regimes Past 
agreements that were part of the Indo Pakistan joint commission efforts have been put in cold storage A sense 
of insecurity prevails m Pakistan regarding India s ambitions to capture Pakistani markets 
CBMs m  the cultural field  As m the economic Held, there has been no real progress in the sociocultural field 
The cultural agreement signed between the two countries m December 1988 is nonexistent for all practical 
purposes It seems, because of political tensions that breakthroughs m social and cultural fields cannot be 
achieved currently
CBMs in defense and security This is the only area in which India and Pakistan have made substantial progress 
m the last few years CBMs m these areas are periodically discussed by the directors general for military 
operations and between foreign secretaries and defense secretaries of the two countries
CBMs m  the environment There is a tremendous opportunity for adoptmg CBMs m this areas Both countries 
are obsessed with problems related to environmental pollution and the scarcity of water The two countries can 
also cooperate m areas such as energy forests communications and disposal of nuclear and other waste
In order to successfully apply nonmilitary CBMs m the Indo Pakistan context the following requirements need 
to be achieved
Cessation of mutually hostile propaganda this would require the adoption of a new approach to dealing with 
crisis management, particularly m areas m which emotions and sentiments are highly charged
32 Seymour M Hersh On the Nuclear Edge New Yorker 29 March 1993 p 56 73
33 The Muslim* 28 August 1991
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The parties involved in CBMs should encourage dialogue at both governmental and nongovernmental levels 
In this connection private diplomacy or informal talks among nongovernmental experts m media, 
academia, busmess science and technology should be encouraged and period meetings and seminars should be 
held to review progress and identify new areas of cooperation In addition, people to people interactions34 help 
establish a higher level of trust and confidence
Relations between the two countries should be based on equality noninterference and nonintervention m each 
other s internal affairs
Negotiations talks or dialogue on CBMs should be above the level of suspicion and mistrust and not based on 
preconceived notions
The two countries should begin with small issues of cooperation such as environmental protection health 
education, energy sports and so forth These are the areas where proper m ter action will lead to the building of 
mutual trust and confidence The Indo-Pakistan Agenda for CBMs should, however be based on realistic 
assumptions and take into account impediments m this regard
Conflicting issues should not be exaggerated or propagandized because such a practice has vitiated the Indo 
Pakistan normalization process m the past For example the Indo Pakistan normalization process suffered a 
senous setback when hardliners in both countries took advantage of the destruction of the Babri Mosque at 
Ayodhya and unleashed a propaganda campaign against each other The destruction and burning of mosques and 
temples in India and Pakistan and the outbreak of communal riots in the aftermath of incidents m Ayodhya 
escalated tension between New Delhi and Islamabad
Reciprocal steps should be taken to deescalate tension, and such attempts should be well publicized so that at 
the nongovernmental level the tactics of anticooperaUon lobbies could be effecuvely countered For 
eliminating a sense of ill will mistrust, suspicion and hatred against each other it is imperative to remove all 
such stuff from academic syllabi of the two countries which indoctrinates the younger generation of India and 
Pakistan against each other Serious attempts particularly among the educated class through workshops 
seminars and other joint activities should be used to encourage positive thinking for conflict resolution and 
durable peace m the subcontinent
India and Pakistan should demonstrate practical good will and harmony Such an exercise would help dispel 
fears of domination and intervention
As a big neighbor India should adopt the policy of magnanimity vis à vis Pakistan so that Islamabad s sense 
of insecurity regarding New Delhi could be removed
India and Pakistan must keep a balance between military and nonmilitary CBMs It has been a practice of the 
two countries m the recent past to focus more on CBMs at the military level and overlooked the significance 
and opportunities for nonmilitary CBMs m fields like economics environment, water resources infrastructure 
(communications power stations etc ) education, culture science and technology
Institutional linkages between India and Pakistan for monitoring the process of CBMs should be created These 
linkages should be used to fill m the gaps that develop in the normalization process The two countries should 
take all possible steps to ensure that the normalization process develops m a balanced way 
Positive interactions in busmess and commerce need to be promoted so that each side has an economic stake in 
the other Such a step would restrain the spread of ill will insecurity and negative feelmgs
CBMs History of Proposals
Over the years a number of proposals have been presented concerning CBMs to defuse tension along the borders 
and normalize bilateral relations between India and Pakistan CBMs presented from the Indian side have been 
more often directed to the establishment of political economic and sociocultural relations with Pakistan
The Indian argument regarding suggested CBMs is notwithstanding tern tonal and political disputes New 
Delhi and Islamabad can go ahead with their normalization process Contrary to the Indian argument Pakistan 
gives much importance to the settlement of outstanding disputes particularly Kashmir before embarking on 
nonmilitary CBMs Thus Pakistan s stand on CBMs particularly nonmilitary CBMs has been somewhat 
different from India s stand For Islamabad the relevance of CBMs with India exists only when New Delhi
34 People to-people diplomacy has been defined by an Indian author as outside the stereotyped diplomacy that is conducted by 
the chanceries of different countries In people to-people diplomacy there has to be an opportunity as well as the urgency of 
interaction among nauons at the popular level. See Nikhil Chakravartty People To People Diplomacy Needed The Tribune 
(Chandigarh) 6 May 1992
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abandons its policy of domination m South Asia and stops its interference in Pakistan s internal affairs 
particularly m Sindh
In fact, both sides undermine the necessity to simultaneously adopt military and nonmilitary CBMs India 
has its own reasons to emphasize the adoption of nonmilitary CBMs before settling the Kashmir dispute and 
Pakistan feels it is meaningless to go for these CBMs without settling its disputes with India However both 
India and Pakistan favor the adoption of military CBMs The stalemate on the simultaneous adoption of 
military and nonmilitary CBMs has deepened their confrontation
Some circles quote the Simla Agreement as a model of for the Indo-Pakistan normalization process 
especially references concerning the peaceful settlement of disputes Institutional measures for cooperation taken 
by India and Pakistan in the post Sun la accord penod however account for only partial success There have 
been frequent ups and downs owing to poliucal tension
New Delhi and Islamabad saw two reasons to adopt military oriented CBMs Fust Islamabad felt a threat 
coming from what it perceived as Indian designs to attack Pakistan s nuclear installations Second the 
escalation of border tension resulted from Operation Brasstacks” launched by India in the winter of 1986 87 and 
the subsequent deployment of Pakistani forces along the Indian borders in response could have led to an 
accidental war between India and Pakistan with the possibility of nuclear involvement Given this background 
the key objective of Indo-Pakistan military CBMs has been to avoid the outbreak of an accidental war and 
establish a communication line between the top military brass of the two countries
In the summer of 1990 when the Kashmu dispute threatened a new outbreak of hostilities in the 
subcontinent, India and Pakistan decided to launch bilateral talks at the foreign secretary level for deescalation of 
tension and normalization of relations The readiness on the part of India and Pakistan to start foreign 
secretaries talks despite escalation of Kashmu and other disputes could be termed as an exercise in confidence 
building ” Instead of gomg to war India and Pakistan decided to exercise restraint and deescalate tension by 
holding talks at the foreign and defense secretaries level
Several rounds of talks at both levels have been held since and almost half a dozen CBMs have been 
adopted by the two countries Such progress is m sharp contrast to past Indo-Pakistan periods of mcreased 
tension that have resulted in three wars in the twenty five years since mdependence
In August 1990 India proposed five nonmilitary CBMs to improve relauons with Pakistan
Statements [should be] made by political and military leaders in Pakistan disassociating themselves from [acts 
of] terrorism and subversion m the [Indian states of] Punjab Jammu and Kashmir
The handing over of [ten] fugiUves who have been operating from Pakistan India also asked Pakistan to hand 
over Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front leader Amanullah Khan Such a request was promptly turned down by 
Pakistan
Seizure [by Pakistan] of arms and ammunition [that are] being smuggled into India and the arrest of infiltrators 
[who have been] crossing into India.
Cessation of official statements and pronouncements from Pakistan inciting violence and striking communal 
passion m India.
Closure of officially sponsored funds that have been put m Pakistan m connection with recent developments m 
Jammu and Kashmir 35
Military CBMs presented by India were
Prior nouce of military exercises mcludmg troop movement 
Regular contacts between military establishments 
Prevention of air violations 
Exchange of military delegations 
Joint patrolling
Closure of camps stoppage of supply of arms and support to poliucal intruders
Reaffirmation of certain elements of the Simla accord that envisaged step by step resoluuon of all bilateral 
disputes and issues
35 See “To Improve Ties with Pakistan India Suggests Five New Steps Indian Express (New Delhi) 12 August 1990
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Pakistan repeatedly denied allegations levied by India on supporting terrorist activities in its controlled part 
of Kashmir and in the province of Punjab It rejected the Indian demand to hand over JKLF leader Amanullah 
Khan Islamabad has often blamed India for interfering in Sindh and encouraging separatist elements there In 
order to reduce tension between India and Pakistan it is essential that some agreement be reached on a policy of 
noninterference and nonintervention in each other s internal affairs The two countries can discuss areas of 
political divergence in the normalization talks periodically held m New Delhi and Islamabad.
Currently six rounds of talks have been held and discussion on a wide variety of topics has led to signing a 
number of agreements on CBMs Former Indian Prime Minister V P Singh described the first round of Indo- 
Pakistan normalization talks held in July 1990 as a good sign” and stated that the dialogue would continue He 
mam tamed that Islamabad talks were preliminary and exploratory m nature To accept anything spectacular out 
of this meeting would be misplaced. We had offered a package of confidence building measures as a part of our 
effort to improve relations to resolve problems 36
For Pakistan a major impediment to normalizing its relations with India continues to be the Kashmir 
dispute Unless the core and central issue of Kashmir is taken up and resolved normalization of relations with 
India is not possible37
Two conclusions could be made from examining the Indo-Pakistan normalization talks First, these talks 
are held at the official level and agreements signed are merely restricted to military/secunty matters Second, 
because of political reasons progress achieved in these talks will not be durable For example after the sixth 
round of talks held in August 1992 and the subsequent defense secretaries talks held in November of the same 
year political relations between the two countries deteriorated to an alarming extent particularly when two 
visiting Pakistani nationals were reportedly killed by ndian security forces 38 diplomats from each side were 
manhandled and communal violence against Mushms in India reached an unsurpassed level in the backdrop of 
events m Ayodhya Therefore gams achieved in Indo-Pakistan talks are lost when something goes wrong 
quickly the two countries are back to square one Tables 1 and 2 depict different military and nonmilitary CBMs 
taken by India and Pakistan progress made m Indo Pakistan normalization obstructions for the application of 
CBMs and the role of domesuc politics vis à vis efforts for Indo-Pakistan normalization
TABLE 1 First Generation CBMs (Military)
Issues Agreements
Protection of 
Nuclear Installations
On 31 December 1988 India and Pakistan agreed to exchange detailed information on 
nuclear power and research facilities and to refrain from attacking each other s nuclear 
installations Earlier in December 1985 an understanding between the two countries 
had been reached m a meeting between President Zia and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi
NoUficauon of 
Military Exercises
On 6 April 1991 India and Pakistan signed an accord pledging not to hold military 
exercises near their borders without first informing their military counterparts In 
April 1992 foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan exchanged instruments of 
ratification on military exercises maneuvers and troop movement
Airspace Violations On 6 April 1991 in an accord signed between India and Pakistan it was agreed to allow 
each other s civilian aircraft to fly and land m each other s territories through 
specified corridors
Regular Telephone Contacts 
[Hot Line]
In the third round of foreign secretaries talks it was decided that the abandoned 
regular telephonic contacts between the Directors General of Military Operations be 
renewed routinely on a weekly basis to exchange information about military 
exercises maneuvers and airspace violations
Redeployment of 
Troops m Suchen
Six rounds of talks at the defense secretaries level have been held to settle the 
Suchen dispute The last round of talks was held m New Delhi but failed to achieve 
any breakthrough
Other Issues Meeting of Surveyors General to discuss demarcation of the land boundary m Sir 
Creek Wuler Barrage/Tulbul navigation proiecL
36 Dawn 21 July 1990
37 Ibid 13 August 1990
38 See “Killing of 2 Pakistanis in India Islamabad Delhi Tension Mounting Dawn 22 October 1992
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TABLE 2 Fust Generation CB Ms (Nonmilitary)
Issues Agreements
Economic and Other 
Areas of Cooperation
On 10 March 1983 India and Pakistan signed an agreement establishing an Indo 
Pakistan Jomt Commission to strengthen good neighborly relations and promote 
cooperation in a range of areas outside political and military questions Four 
subcommissions were established to promote cooperation in economic health science 
and technology sports travel tounsm, and consular matters On 31 December 1988 
India and Pakistan signed an accord to end double taxation of each other s airlines It 
exempted the profits of the two national airlines operating m or through each other s 
territory from taxation by the other country
Communications In May 1984 India and Pakistan decided to establish through bookings on their 
respective railways issue double entry transit visas and install coaxial cable between 
Amritsar and Lahore
Travel In May 1984 India and Pakistan signed proposals on group tounsm and a letter of 
intention, easmg visa difficulties and police reporting m either country In the third 
meeting of Indo Pakistan Jomt Commission held m July 1989 decisions were made for 
extending facilities for travel and tounsm
Agricultural research An Indo Pakistan subcommission also dealt with agncultural research and exchange of 
scientific literature information and methodologies
Cultural cooperation In December 1988 India and Pakistan signed an accord to increase cultural cooperation 
and exchange At the third meeting of Indo Pakistan Jomt Commission held m July 
1989 a three year (1989 91) cultural exchange program was approved that envisaged 
cooperation m education, art and culture, and sports exchange of newspapers and 
periodicals participation m each other s films festivals exchange of film delegations 
and radio and T V professionals translation and exchange of books periodicals and 
other educational cultural and sports publications They also agreed to ensure that 
there was no misrepresentation of facts about each other s country in text books This 
agreement was to be automatically renewed after the expiration of its original duration 
unless any of the two signatories notified m writing its desire to cancel it.
Treatment of diplomats In August 1992 India and Pakistan signed an agreement regarding a code of conduct on 
treatment of each other s diplomats
Following is the list of resolved and unresolved conflicts between India and Pakistan 
Conflicts resolved
Division o f Assets and Liabilities It was decided in December 1947 that the Government of Pakistan would 
receive 750 million rupees from India as its share of the balances in undivided India.
River Water Dispute The Indus water treaty signed in September 1960
Rann o f Kutch Boundary Dispute Resolved by a three member commission in Geneva m 1968
Salai Dam Agreement Signed m 1978
Conflicts Yet To Be Resolved
Kashmir It is the only major outstanding unresolved dispute between India and Pakistan smce 1947 The 
matter has been on the UN agenda smce 1948 India and Pakistan have fought two wars over Kashmir and the 
recent deterioration m relations between New Delhi and Islamabad is related to an uprising in the Indian 
controlled part of Kashmir
Stachen Smce 1984 India and Pakistan have been militarily engaged over the Siachen Glacier Historically 
the agreement of 27 July 1949 that defined the cease fire Ime between India and Pakistan m Kashmir left its 
northern end vague thence north to the glacier In the Simla Agreement, a Ime of control was drawn up afresh 
and defined on 12 November 1972 but it did not extend to the Siachen Glacier In 1984 the race for control 
over Siachen began between India and Pakistan In June 1989 on the occasion of the fifth round of the Indo 
Pakistan defence secretaries talks the two countries were close to an agreement on Siachen. They had agreed to 
work towards a comprehensive settlement based on redeployment of their forces to reduce the chances of 
conflict, avoidance of the use of force and the determination of future positions on the ground so as to conform 
with the Simla Agreement and to ensure a durable peace m the Siachen area But, according to Pakistan, India
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backed out of the understanding it had reached with Islamabad in June 1989 Smce then no breakthrough has 
been achieved on the settlement of the Siachen dispute 39
Nuclear Issue The Indo Pakistan disagreement on the question of nuclear nonproliferation m South Asia not 
only concerns New Delhi and Islamabad but also external powers India has termed the Nuclear Non 
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 discriminatory and has refused to sign it and has called for the inclusion of 
China for any sort of understanding on the nuclear issue Pakistan has made it clear that it will not unilaterally 
sign the NPT unless India does the same
Wuler Barrage The Wuler Barrage dispute concerns a barrage to be constructed by the Indian Government on the 
Jhelum River below the Wuler Lake m order to improve the lake s navigability during the winter when there is a 
drop m the water level New Delhi launched the Tulbul Navigation Project to regulate the decrease of water The 
Jhelum is one of three rivers that the Indus Treaty of 1960 (signed by India and Pakistan) assigns to Pakistan for 
unrestricted use, but with precise exceptions One of them is any control or use of water for navigation by 
India provided it has not diminished the volume of water Storage of water or construction of storage works is 
forbidden The issue therefore, is whether the barrage on river Jhelum will be a project for the control or use 
of water for navigation or is a storage work Smce the waters will be confined for some time in order to raise 
the level of Wuler Lake there will be storage temporarily India has shown concern for the lower npanan 
(Pakistan) and suspended work on the project.40 Talks on the Wuler Barrage are continuing between New Delhi 
and Islamabad Pakistan wants certain safeguards from India that the volume of water in the Jhelum nver as it 
enters Pakistan will not be diminished and that the Wuler Barrage project will be m the interest of both India 
and Pakistan
Demarcation o f Sir Creek Sir Creek is a 60 mile long estuary m the marshes of the Rann of Kutch The Indo 
Pakistan Western Boundary Case Tribunal s Award signed on 19 February 1968 apart from settling the Rann of 
Kutch dispute did not demarcate the boundary from the top of Sir Creek westward to north of the Creek on the 
Arabian Sea. The Tribunal noted that m view of the aforesaid agreement, the question concerning the Sir Creek 
part of the boundary is left out of consideration It has now become a bone of contention between India and 
Pakistan India contends that the boundary lies in the middle of the Creek Pakistan claims that it lies on its 
eastern bank on the Indian side and therefore the entire Creek belongs to Pakistan Pakistan insists that the 
creek boundary be delimited first so as to establish the point on land from which the sea boundary is to be 
limited. India s concerns center on the maritime boundary 41 The Sir Creek dispute is included m Indo Pakistan 
parleys to settle conflicts but no breakthrough has been achieved so far
From the information presented above and Tables 1 and 2 three important points can be made First, since 
1972 India and Pakistan have been interested in adopting CBMs m the military security field to the neglect of 
significant nonmilitary CBMs As a result the two countries have failed to achieve any major durable success 
toward peace and stability in the subcontinent Second India and Pakistan have not moved systematically 
towards the goal of tension free relations There is lack of political will on the part of the regimes in power— 
past and present—to institutionalize the normalization process by giving senous consideration to nonmilitary 
CBMs Third India and Pakistan in the past have been successful in resolving some of their conflicts such as 
nver water disputes and the Rann of Kutch boundary dispute If the two countries have previously managed to 
settle some of their outstanding disputes there is a possibility that they can achieve similar success now
Indo-Pakistan difference m perceptions concerning CBMs is twofold first New Delhi wants Pakistan to 
agree on applying CBMs related to political economic and cultural fields and argues that outstanding disputes 
should either be frozen or left aside for future discussions In this regard, India cites the Simla Agreement as a 
model for its normalization of relations with Pakistan But Pakistan feels that the entire process of CBMs 
cannot render positive results unless the following measures are adopted by the two sides
Settlement of bilateral disputes particularly those related to Kashmir Siachen, Wuler Barrage Sir Creek, and 
the protection of the Muslim minority m India Some circles m Pakistan argue that if the Kashmir dispute is 
settled according to the UN Security Council resolution, a major breakthrough can be achieved for normalizing 
relations with India. Another point of view in this regard is that even if the Kashmir dispute is settled other 
conflicts may obstruct the road to peace and cooperation in the subcontinent Against this background, it will 
be difficult to cut the Gordian Knot m Indo Pakistan ties because decades of animosity and ill will between the 
two countries has made it rather difficult to start a new era of friendship m Indo Pakistan relations
39 A G Noorani "Sir Creek Wuler and Siachen Indian Express 5 August 1991 See also Pravin Sawhney “The Strategy of 
Suchen ” Indian Express 24 August 1992
40 A G Noorani “Sir Creek Wuler and Suchen.
41 A. G Noorani, Ibid.
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Settlement of the nuclear issue based on a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in South Asia and the simultaneous 
signing of the NPT by the two countries
Adherence to the policy of noninterference and nonintervention in each other s internal affairs 
India should dispel fears and doubts present among its neighbors regarding its regional ambiUons and 
expansionist tendencies
Pakistan knows that it cannot win a conventional war with India therefore the best possible strategy to 
effectively cope with the Indian threat will be to achieve nuclear capability and use it as a deterrent to any future 
Indian designs against Pakistan s territorial sovereignty
Pakistan s sense of insecurity vis à vis India was institutionalized with its dismemberment in 1971 and the 
role of New Delhi in this regard On these grounds it is argued by some Pakistani strategic thinkers that 
equipped with nuclear capability Islamabad can successfully overcome the strategically weak position it found 
itself in in 1971
Given the serious risks involved in a nuclear arms race on the subcontinent both India and Pakistan must 
adopt a realistic approach to nuclear weapons in South Asia that takes into account costs risks and 
environmental dangers Even if India and Pakistan do not exercise the nuclear option the threat of an accidental 
war with the possibility of a nuclear exchange would loom large Even by adopting CBMs India and Pakistan 
cannot fully eliminate the nuclear threat
It goes without saying that Indo-Pakistan relations have an overwhelming bearing on peace and conflict in 
the South Asian region thus making the application of CBMs crucial Amity goodwill and trust between the 
two countries would accelerate the process of regional cooperation m South Asia42 and ensure stability in the 
Asia/Pacific region However according to some scholars the primary objective for India since 1947 has been 
to exclude the major external powers from achieving any significant influence or role in the subcontinent. Since 
this has not been possible for a variety of reasons New Delhi has instead sought to manipulate and limit the 
involvement of external powers in the region in ways that serve Indian objectives and interests When one or 
more major powers would not cooperate India has invited the involvement of the other as a counterweight In 
other words it has used balance of power politics despite its rhetorical aversion to that principle Whereas the 
other South Asian states m most instances have perceived the external powers in terms very different from 
New Delhi43 On these grounds India s quest for preeminence in the region compelled other South Asian 
countries to involve other powers on terms that imposed their bargaming position with New Delhi and 
contributed to their security in other ways as well44
India s role vis à vis its neighbors is thus a decisive factor in the application of CBMs Much is required 
particularly from New Delhi s side to ease tension and hostility so that the present deadlock on the 
improvement of bilateral relations with Islamabad is removed
Challenges to CBMs
Some of the challenges to the application of CBMs in the Indo Pakistan context come from domestic political 
factors There are strong forces within the two countries that miss no opportunity to accentuate the level of 
tension and hatred An Indian journalist Nikhil Chakravartty has very well described how extremist elements 
in India and Pakistan have succeeded m perpetuating ill will and hatred between the two countries He says 
We have a relationship of low tension between India and Pakistan, accentuated by provocation by 
extremists on both sides The wall of ignorance and suspicion that divides our two countries has been 
reinforced by a whole lot of taboos and restrictions We have a visa system that demands reporting regularly 
to the police, which can by no means be regarded as congenial We do not exchange newspapers we hardly 
exchange television programs though we watch each other s surreptiUously across the frontier There are few 
press correspondents m each other s territory and we depend largely on foreign wire services to shape our
42 A M Vohra Relevance of South Asian Cooperation The Muslim 9 March 1984 Prem Shankar Jha What India and 
Pakistan Can Do ” The Hindu (New Delhi) 19 August 1992
43 Leo E Rose “South Asia and the Outside Worid in A Jeyaratham Wilson and Dennis Délions eds The States o f  South 
Asut Problems o f National Integration (London C Hurst and Company 1982) p 320
44 Ibid.
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attitudes towards each other Our scholars and specialists meet occasionally mainly at international 
gatherings Cases of direct interaction (not to speak of interface) are few and far between 45
Outbreak of communal nots interference m each other s internal affairs and an arms buildup provide legitimacy 
to hawkish elements and enable them to destabilize the process of normalization Beyond any shadow of doubt 
extremists and hardliners are a threat to the cause of confidence building between India and Pakistan
Indeed vested interest groups have badly hampered efforts for peace between India and Pakistan 
Emotionally charged statements are being issued from both sides to subvert attempts being made for deescalauon 
of tension For instance opening the Bharatya Janata Party s (BJP) campaign m the eastern region of India, the 
party leader L K Advam said in Calcutta on 24 March 1991 that he expected the people of Pakistan to realize 
the folly of partition and join the Indian union sometime in the future A unification was not unlikely as in the 
case of East and West Germany which represented two different systems of government that had come together 
The people of Pakistan would realize then- cultural unity with India and that Pakistan Bangladesh Sn Lanka 
Burma Nepal and Bhutan could join the federation i e Akhand B harat146 However he ruled out the use of 
force in making Pakistan a part of India
Even if one disregards the militancy of BJP m Indian politics and its covert ambition to undo partition 
some circles m Pakistan cannot remain oblivious of such a political development Their fears and 
apprehensions are legitimate given the fact that BJP is no longer an insignificant political party with three 
members in the Indian Lower House but now has around 119 members It is a substantial force to reckon with 
Like India Pakistan also has political groups47 that have a hardline posture vis à vis New Delhi Their slogans 
like ‘Crush India” and their dreams of hoisting the Pakistani flag over the Red Fort of Delhi are equally 
reprehensible and fanciful Given the fact that extremist groups have substantial influence in both India and 
Pakistan the tasks of conflict resolution and confidence building could become difficult On the official level 
too the recent approaches have not been in consonance with the spirit of goodwill and amity A Pakistan 
foreign ministry spokesman launched a bitter tirade against New Delhi when he said in Islamabad on 24 
February 1993 that
It was New Delhi that was responsible for the difficulties in the relations between the two countries 
India has remained unwilling to resolve its disputes with Pakistan m accordance with the Simla Agreement 
There were three main instances when the Indian attitude has been nonresponsive towards reconciliation 
gestures by Islamabad First, India s negative reaction to Prime Minister Nawaz Shanf s proposal for talks 
on the Jammu and Kashmir problem in accordance with Article 6 of the Simla Agreement Second, the Indian 
rejection of [the] Prune Minister s proposal for a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone m South Asia Thud, the Indian 
refusal to withdraw its forces from the Siachcn Glacier area where New Delhi had committed a violation of the 
Simla Agreement48
Similarly making a policy statement at the commencement of a three day debate on foreign policy in the 
National Assembly on 17 February 1993 the State Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan Mr Siddiq Khan 
Kanju said that
India s large conventional forces remain as senous as ever and has vutually closed the process of 
dialogue Pakistan s relations with India have never been easy Today these relations are passing through a 
very difficult period India has adopted an inflexible position on all issues between the two countries from 
the core issue of Kashnur to the simple question of the demarcation of the Su Creek area India assumed the 
notion that it was the largest power m South Asia and entitled to have its own way whether nght or wrong 
We can never accept this assumption The Prime Minister has proposed a dialogue in seven meetings with 
his Indian counterparts but, unfortunately the reply received from the Indians has foreclosed the avenue of 
any meaningful dialogue 49
Indo-Pakistan tension escalated rapidly during December 1992 for two reasons first, the maltreatment of 
Pakistani diplomats in New Delhi and the killing of two Pakistani citizens m India Second the destruction of 
the Babn Mosque accentuated the negative feelings in Pakistan and India and led to the near suspension of 
diplomatic relations
45 Nikhil Chakravaruy
46 See news item “Pakistan Should Rejoin India The Telegraph (Calcutta) 25 March 1991
47 As in the nght wing Jamaal i ¡slami and a section within the Pakistan Peoples Patty (PPP) Anti Indian feelings are 
forcefully expressed in the case of the Kashnur dispute or the communal nots m India
48 Dawn 25 February 1993
49 Ibid.
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In a regular briefing of Islamabad s diplomatic press corps a foreign ministry spokesman advised Pakistani 
nationals against travel to India He pointed out that in view of the recent deaths of two Pakistani travelers in 
India at the hands of Indian security forces and other cases of harassment and torture the government strongly 
recommends that Pakistanis should avoid traveling to India.50 Such a warning was unprecedented and 
unsurpassed in recent years and depicted the new level of tension between the two countries India and Pakistan 
also expelled some of each other s diplomats and Pakistan asked India to reduce its diplomane staff in Karachi a 
step that India had taken earlier against Pakistan s diplomatic mission in Bombay
The Indian Government, however reacted vehemently to Pakistani criticism regarding its policies In a 
statement issued m New Delhi in October 1992 the Indian Government condemned the Pakistan National 
Assembly s resolutions on Kashmir It described the Pakistani action as a blatant attempt at interfering m 
India s internal affairs ” The statement reiterated that Kashmir is and will remain an integral part of India.” It 
further stated that the resolution passed by Pakistan s National Assembly was a deliberate attempt to continue 
active support by Islamabad of terrorist and subversive activities in Jammu and Kashmir This resolution once 
again creates doubt about Pakistan s sincerity m reducing tension with India. 51
Charges and counter charges by the two sides should be seen in the dichotomy of the lack of a responsible 
approach adopted by the policymakers of India and Pakistan on handling conflicting matters and by the role 
played by the media of the two countries in escalating tension
Conclusions
The Gordian Knot of Indo-Pakistan conflict can only be cut if the two countries adopt the following 
strategies to establish a CBM regime Such a regime should be established by the governmental and 
nongovernmental circles of India and Pakistan to institutionalize the process of conflict resolution and 
confidence building in South Asia
Formation of a task force of nonofficial experts m economic political and security fields The task force 
should have an in depth understanding of their country s official policies and its objective should be to 
establish poliucal will among the elites of India and Pakistan for normalization m their relations All such 
efforts could be earned out within the framework of pnvate diplomacy by the influential circles at the 
governmental and nongovernmental level of the two countnes The role of pnvate diplomacy in CBMs was 
examined by a Western scholar who pointed out that pnvate diplomacy seems best suited to develop the 
preconditions for problem solvmg that is by creating a readmess on the part of governments to consider 
movmg toward the resoluUon of issues In pursuit of this broad objective private activities may range from 
establishing contacts with appropnate pnvate persons on the other side to develop a clear image of the 
interests and perceptions of one s counterpart on particular issues to create new pictures or concepts about how 
a question of mutual interest might be resolved S2 Détente achieved (during the Nixon and Carter years) between 
Washington and Moscow was also the result of years of pnvate diplomacy conducted by experts and former 
government high officials for that purpose India and Pakistan can learn from these expenences 
Help and assistance could be received from experts of countnes who are mvolved in CBMs m other parts of the 
world. Their expertise and suggestions on the mode of deescalation of tension could help the experts of India 
and Pakistan to tactfully handle their conflicts
In a situation where Indo Pakistan tension has reached an alarming stage one possible strategy to diffuse 
tension could be the visit of task force members to each country and the holding of a dialogue on the modalities 
of the normalization process Some of the think tanks that influence the policymaking process of India and 
Pakistan have tried to deescalate tension by organizing seminars and conferences symposia, or a close door 
session But the scope of such activities for conflict resolution and confidence building should be broadened 
and should focus more on dialogue based on new thinking instead of rhetoric
Maintaining high level diplomatic contacts helps to promote dialogue m a polarized atmosphere In Indo 
Pakistan relations one can hear reports regarding the visits of foreign secretaries and other governmental 
officials The failure of diplomacy may lead to further erosion m Indo Pakistan relations with predictable 
consequences
50 Ibid 3 December 1992.
51 See “Government Condemns Pakistan s Kashmir Resolution Delhi All India Radio Network ui English reproduced in FBIS 
Daily Report Near East <& South Asia (28 October 1992) 45
52 Philip D Stewart in David Newson ed Private Diplomacy with the Soviet Union (Washington Institute for the Study of 
Diplomacy) p  9
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The hot line between the director generals of military operations of India and Pakistan was resumed in 1991 to 
avert any miscalculation or a crisis situation At present the need is to use that channel effectively for 
reviewmg the border situation, especially m Punjab and Kashmir
As mentioned earlier both India and Pakistan must give due importance to CBMs on a nonmilitary level There 
is a need to form a CBM regime to monitor the process of conflict resolution through confidence building 
measures It should mclude the members of the proposed task force and policymakers and should coordmate 
with similar groups and governments m other parts of the world so as to share expertise and experience on 
conflict resolution and confidence building
As suggested by Christian Harleman, the proper infrastructure for confidence and peace building should be set 
in place for conflict resolution and management In this regard, an important step for the successful application 
of CBMs between India and Pakistan should be coordination between peace and conflict resolution centers of 
the two countries Apart from dialogue on the governmental level, it is imperative that like minded groups and 
institutions who are concerned regarding the Indo Pakistan Cold War should get together and ponder on 
ways and means to ease tension and institutionalize the process of normalization Such people should explore 
possibilities to end decades of hostilities between the two neighboring countries Notwithstanding 
impediments the process has started and, if sustained efforts are made positive results for conflict and tension 
reduction could be achieved
There are three possible outcomes with regard to the existing level of tension between New Delhi and Islamabad 
Maintenance of the status quo that is the propaganda campaign will continue and each country will persist in 
charging the other with intervention m their internal affairs It means sustaining a no war and no peace 
situation
The situation may take an alarming turn for the worse if border tension escalates and existing CBMs in the 
military freíd such as the hot Ime and troop monitoring may collapse Such an eventuality will lead to the 
outbreak of the fourth Indo Pakistan war thus inviting the predictable catastrophe
It is possible that, as a result of official and nonoffrcial diplomatic endeavors Indo Pakistan tension may be 
defused and the two countries may decide to settle their outstanding disputes through negotiations Given the 
existing level of tension there still exists a remote possibility of deescalation m Indo Pakistan relations 
Much depends on the outcome of existing fragile efforts for normalization between New Delhi and Islamabad
But contradictory statements are currently being issued by the policymakers of India and Pakistan on various 
critical aspects of their relationship One circle in both countries is not hesitant to unveil a looming threat of 
war m the subcontinent. Whereas the other circle present in both countries calls for the holding of meaningful 
dialogue for cnsis management and peaceful settlement of disputes
Nonetheless confidence building measures have a tremendous scope for conflict resolution in the 
subcontinent. But in practical terms the mechanism of CBMs depends upon the institutionalized processes of 
cooperation between the two countries and management of accidental crises like the Babn Mosque and treatment 
of each other s diplomatic staff
Future prospects of CBMs in Indo Pakistan relaUons however depend upon the holding of normalization 
talks deescalation m propaganda warfare and New Delhi s readiness to dispel fears and suspicions in Islamabad 
regarding its political ambitions m South Asia The same is true m the case of Pakistan as it should 
understand the Indian charges regarding interference m Punjab and Kashmir
If the two countries succeed in getting out of the vicious cycle of confrontation it will become possible to 
seek positive results from CBMs The task is difficult but not impossible because the two countries have 
launched the first generation confidence building measures
The need is to stabilize and strengthen this process and reinforce endeavors for conflict resolution by 
adopting CBMs at both the nonmilitary and military levels particularly in economic and political fields If the 
CBMs fail to remove past animosities and mistrust the normalization process between India and Pakistan may 
not yield positive results A CBM regime consisting of a balanced program holds the key for conflict and 
tension free ties between India and Pakistan Therefore the road to CBMs passes through both New Delhi and 
Islamabad and the two countries should each feel equally responsible for making such a regime a success
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